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JUDICIAL REFORM IN CHINA: IMPROVING
ARBITRATION AWARD ENFORCEMENT BY
ESTABLISHING A FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM
David T. Wang*
I. INTRODUCTION
Winning an arbitration award after a difficult and costly
arbitration is normally cause for relief, if not outright
celebration. However, in China, this may simply be the
beginning of another complex and arduous journey. Arbitral
awards in China are enforced through its judicial system.
Unfortunately, structural problems inherent in the system,
like local protectionism and a weak judiciary, often prevent
the enforcement of these awards.
This comment examines how the addition of a federal
court system in China will eliminate local protectionism,
strengthen the judiciary, and improve the enforcement of
arbitral awards. Part II provides background on the
structure of China's judiciary, its relationship to the
government, and some of the current problems facing the
courts. This section also gives a brief overview of Chinese
arbitration and the Arbitration Law. Part III identifies the
specific legal issues facing China: The government must
resolve significant deficiencies in its judicial system to
improve the enforcement of arbitral awards. Part IV
examines these deficiencies and also discusses some of the
inadequate measures taken by the government to facilitate
enforcement. Part V proposes the implementation of a
federal court system to remedy these institutional deficiencies
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love and support. I also wish to thank Professor Anna M. Han and the editors
of the Santa Clara Law Review for their insightful comments and edits.
649
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
in China's legal system. This section identifies the numerous
benefits a federal court system would offer and explores the
likely impact of such a regime on China's judicial system and
enforcement of arbitral awards. Part V also addresses
perceived challenges to implementing a federal system.
In recent years, China has taken critical steps to bolster
judicial independence and eradicate harmful local
protectionism.1  However, the creation of a federal court
system will help China evolve into a first-rate international
arbitral forum, inspire greater confidence in the judicial
system, and further fuel China's meteoric growth.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Current Landscape-The Courts and Their Relationship
to the Government
China's judicial system contains courts of general as well
as specific jurisdiction.2 There are four levels of courts of
general jurisdiction.' The highest court in the nation is the
Supreme People's Court (SPC),4 located in Beijing. 5 Beneath
this court lies the Higher Level People's Courts (HPCs). 6
There are thirty HPCs: one for each province,7 autonomous
region,' and centrally administered-city.9 Beneath the HPCs
1. See infra Part IV.B.
2. China Internet Information Center, China's Judiciary, ch. I The Trial
System, http://www.china.org.cn/englishIJudiciary/31280.htm (last visited Feb.
10, 2008). Courts of specific jurisdiction handle maritime, military, and railway
cases. Id.
3. Donald C. Clarke, Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System: The
Enforcement of Civil Judgments, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 6 (1996).
4. Id. at 7.
5. DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 200 (2003).
6. Id.
7. Clarke, supra note 3, at 7. China is divided into twenty-three provinces.
Jessica Zoe Renwald, Foreign Investment Law in the People's Republic of China:
What to Expect from Enterprise Establishment to Dispute Resolution, 16 IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 453, 455 (2006). Each province is then subdivided into
prefectures, counties, and cities. Id. In addition, each county may also be
subdivided into townships, national minority townships, or towns. Id. Despite
these different units of government, the Chinese regime is still a "unitary
system" with all authority coming from the central government. Id.
8. Clarke, supra note 3, at 7. An autonomous region is a first-level
administrative subdivision of China. See CHOW supra note 5, at 82. Like
Chinese provinces, an autonomous region has its own local government, but an
[Vo1:48650
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are 389 Intermediate Level People's Courts (IPCs).10 These
courts are established just below the provincial level in
prefectures, provincially-administered cities,11 and within
centrally-administered cities.' 2 At the lowest level are the
roughly three thousand Basic Level People's Courts (BPCs)
that exist at the county level.13 These courts consist of
criminal, civil, economic, and enforcement divisions. 4
The judiciary in China differs significantly from those of
developed western countries. 15  Courts in the People's
Republic of China (PRC) are weaker institutionally. 6 One of
the root causes of this weakness is the organizational
structure of the judiciary as established by China's
Constitution. 7 Article 126 of the Constitution states "The
people's courts shall, in accordance with the law, exercise
judicial power independently and are not subject to
interference by administrative organs, public organizations or
autonomous region has more legislative rights. See id. It is a minority entity
and has a higher population of a particular minority ethnic group. Id. There
are five autonomous regions in China: Guanxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia,
Xinjiang, and Xizang (Tibet). Id. at 81-82.
9. Clarke, supra note 3, at 7. A centrally-administered city is a special
municipality directly controlled by the central government, as compared to the
local government. Id. There are four such municipalities: Beijing, Shanghai,
Tianjin, and Chongqing. CHOW, supra note 5, at 81.
10. Clarke, supra note 3, at 7.
11. A provincially-administered city is a city controlled by the laws and
regulations of the province in which it sits. See Peter H. Come, Creation and
Application of Law in the PRC, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 369, 388-89 (2002). Chinese
law permits congresses at the provincial level to enact their own regulations, so
long as it does not conflict with the Constitution, national laws and
administrative legislation. See id.
12. Clarke, supra note 3, at 7.
13. CHOW, supra note 5, at 200 ("In order to provide additional access to the
court system, the basic people's courts [BPCs] have established over 30,000
subordinate divisions known as people's tribunals in towns and villages below
the county level. People's tribunals are considered to be a component part of the
basic people's courts and the judgments of people's tribunals are considered to
be judgments and orders of the basic people's courts.").
14. Graig R. Avino, China's Judiciary: An Instrument of Democratic
Change?, 22 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 369, 379 (2003).
15. Randall Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts: An Empirical Study of
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the PRC, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 294 (2001).
16. Id.
17. See Laifan Lin, Judicial Independence in Japan: A Re-Investigation for
China, 13 COLUM J. ASIAN L. 185, 197-98 (1999). "[U]nder the present
constitutional system, though the court is a relative independent judicial
organization, it is subject to multiple supervision .... Id. at 198.
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individuals.""8  However, Article 128 states "The Supreme
People's Court is responsible to the National People's
Congress and its Standing Committee. Local people's courts
at different levels are responsible to the organs of state power
which created them."19 While the former article is in accord
with western notions of judicial independence and separation
of powers principles, the latter article is not. Indeed, Article
128 more accurately describes the relationship of the courts
with other governmental bodies because of the numerous
internal and external forces that influence court decisions.2 °
B. Internal Influences
Judges in China do not enjoy independent judicial
decision-making.2' Internally, other judges, judicial
superiors, and even higher courts often review the case before
the judgment is issued.22  Higher-level courts may assert
primary jurisdiction over a lower court in order to adjudicate
a particularly influential case in their district.23 Indeed, the
"criteria for determining whether higher-level jurisdiction
should be exercised include the level in the governmental
hierarchy of the departments involved, the amount of money
involved, and the complexity of the case."24 In this manner,
the judiciary is managed like an administrative agency
because junior judges must follow the opinions of chief judges
and the presidents of courts.25
Moreover, if a case is deemed "complicated" but not
reviewed by a higher court, the Adjudication Committee of
the court may intervene to review it.26 This committee
18. XIAN FA [Constitution] art. 126 (1982) (P.R.C.) (as amended Apr. 12,
1998 and Mar. 29, 1993).
19. Id. art. 128.
20. See Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts, supra note 15, at 294-96.
21. Ellen Reinstein, Finding a Happy Ending for Foreign Investors: The
Enforcement of Arbitration Awards in the People's Republic of China, 16 IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 37, 53 (2005).
22. STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER
MAO 260 (1999).
23. Id. at 251.
24. Id.
25. Seth Garz, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Chinese
Communist Party's Leadership and Judicial Independence, Oct. 29, 2003,
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=650.
26. LUBMAN, supra note 22, at 252. Courts of general jurisdiction at all
levels have a president, one or more vice presidents, an Adjudication
[Vo1:48
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includes the president of the court, the vice-president, the
head of specialized chambers, and regular judges. 27  These
members advise individual judges in cases determined to be
important.28 This review by committee members further
detracts from judicial independence because Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) political considerations might
unduly influence the court's ultimate legal decision. Yet
another internal factor affecting judicial independence is the
fact that judges can request guidance and instructions from
higher-level courts on a particular case.29 These practices
continue because of unclear legislation and a concern by
courts that other judges or officials will reverse their
decisions.1o
C. External Influences
Chinese judges also face many external influences, which
exert themselves on the judges' decision-making powers.
First, judges are limited by the structure of the judicial
system because each level of courts is responsible to the
people's congress at the equivalent level1.3  Thus, at the
county level, the local people's congress supervises the work
of BPC judges, the provincial people's congress supervises the
work of IPC and HPC judges and so on.32 Unlike federal
judges in the United States, Chinese judges have no security
of tenure and are appointed and removed by the legislative
body at the same level.33  Judges are beholden to the
equivalent-level government not only in regards to their
employment but to their finances as well. 4
Local party and government organs control every aspect
of local courts, including personnel, funding/budgets, benefits,
employment of children, housing, facilities, promotions and
Committee, judges who work in the divisions, and clerks. Id.; see also
Reinstein, supra note 21, at 49.
27. Reinstein, supra note 21, at 49.
28. Id.
29. LUBMAN, supra note 22, at 263.
30. Id.
31. Randall Peerenboom, The Evolving Regulatory Framework for
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the People's Republic of China, 1 ASIAN-PAC.
L. & POLY J. 12:1, 12:8 (2000).
32. Id.
33. LUBMAN, supra note 22, at 256.
34. Clarke, supra note 3, at 42.
2008] 653
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bonuses.3  Local governments use this power over courts to
exercise influence in a particular case.3 6  This "local
protectionism" occurs because local governments often rely on
local businesses for revenues and employment.3 ' The local
governments fear that their financial interests will be
jeopardized by adverse judgments against these businesses.
The government's relationship to firms may be even more
direct as businesses may be run by local political leaders who
exert influence over the courts to protect their businesses. 9
Judicial independence and autonomy is further eroded by
the judiciary's various links to the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP).40  Although people's congresses are officially
empowered to appoint judges, in practice "judges are often
selected by the CCP Committee on the same level, and the
choices ratified by the people's congresses."4' Most senior
judges are CCP members,42 including members of the
Adjudication Committee, which has considerable authority in
determining the outcome of difficult or controversial cases.43
Moreover, although direct intervention by the CCP is
lessening, judges do discuss cases involving political or
difficult legal issues with the Political-Legal Committee of the
CCP.' Political-Legal Committees include the head of the
public security organ, the president of the people's court, the
president of the people's procuratorate, the head of the
judicial administrative organs, and the head of the
administrative organ for civil affairs at the provincial or local
level.4  These high-powered committees are established by
35. Id. (citing Chen Youxi & Xue Chunbao, Zaocheng Fayuan Zhixing Nan
De San Da Jiben Yinsu [The Three Major Reasons Why Courts Have Difficulty
in Execution], ZHEJIANG FAZHI BAO [ZHEJIANG LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], Aug. 16,
1990, at 3).
36. Id.
37. See id. at 41.
38. Id. at 41-42.
39. Id. at 42.
40. Peerenboom, Evolving Regulatory Framework, supra note 31, at 12:8-9.
41. Id.
42. See Jerome A. Cohen, Reforming China's Civil Procedure: Judging the
Courts, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 793, 797 (1997). "Although there is no formal
requirement that judges be members of the CCP, a very large percentage have
[sic] been, usually perhaps 90 per cent or more." Id.
43. Peerenboom, Evolving Regulatory Framework, supra note 31, at 9.
44. Id. at 9.
45. Id.
654 [Vo1:48
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the CCP and exist at all levels within the judicial system "to
ensure that courts and judges act in accordance with party
dictates."46 The numerous internal and external influences
on China's court system have affected all aspects of the rule of
law, including the enforcement of arbitral awards in China's
arbitration law.
D. Arbitration Law in China
Arbitration is an important and frequently-utilized
dispute resolution tool in China.4" As global interactions
increase, parties often rely on arbitration to deal with
economic and commercial disputes.4 8  The China
International Economic Trade Arbitration Commission
(CIETAC) is an international commercial arbitration
institution that is responsible for resolving these types of
disputes. 9 CIETAC handles disputes arising from contracts
and transactions in foreign trade, particularly disputes
between a foreign firm, company, or other economic
organization and a Chinese organization. 50  CIETAC has
become the world's busiest international arbitration tribunal,
due in part to the increase in commercial transactions
between Chinese and non-Chinese parties.51
In order to accommodate the increase in international
trade and arbitration, the National People's Congress passed
the Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China
(Arbitration Law), effective September 1, 1995.52 The
Arbitration Law established uniformity between arbitral
institutions, provided a procedural code, and set standards for
arbitration personnel and awards. 53 The law also drew upon
international arbitration legislation and practices, especially
46. Avino, supra note 14, at 381.
47. See Zhao Xiuwen & Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Reforming Chinese Arbitration
Law and Practices in the Global Economy, 31 U. DAYTON L. REV. 421, 422
(2006). "The establishment of arbitration law and development of a more robust
legal system supporting domestic and international commercial arbitration in
China since the early 1980s is an important aspect of these changes in the legal
and economic systems." Id. at 422.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 423-24.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 426-27.
52. Reinstein, supra note 21, at 42.
53. Id.
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provisions in the New York Convention on Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York
Convention).54
Three types of arbitral awards exist in China: Foreign,
foreign-related, and domestic. 55 Foreign arbitral awards refer
to any awards made outside of China.5 6  Foreign-related
awards are awards granted by international arbitration
bodies in China, like CIETAC or other local arbitration
commissions that involve a foreign element.5 7  Domestic
awards are awards by local arbitration commissions that do
not involve foreign elements.8 Under current arbitration
law, arbitrations performed outside arbitration commissions
are prohibited. In addition, a valid arbitration agreement
must designate an arbitration commission. 59
Arbitration has played a critical role in China's
development. Unfortunately, the problems associated with
the enforcement of arbitral awards prevent this important
alternative dispute resolution mechanism from playing an
even larger role in China's development.
54. Xiuwen & Kloppenberg, supra note 47, at 428. The New York
Convention established guidelines for enforcing arbitration agreements and
arbitral awards among its 130-plus contracting parties. Jian Zhou, Judicial
Intervention in International Arbitration: A Comparative Study of the Scope of
the New York Convention in U.S. and Chinese Courts, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J.
403, 404 (2006). It requires each contracting country to recognize and enforce
arbitral awards entered in the territory of another country, as well as those
awards that a contracting country considers non-domestic awards. Id. The
New York Convention also requires contracting countries to recognize written
arbitration agreements. Id.
55. Peerenboom, Evolving Regulatory Framework, supra note 31, at 12:11.
56. Reinstein, supra note 21, at 42.
57. Peerenboom, Evolving Regulatory Framework, supra note 31, at 12:11.
A dispute between two Chinese parties may be foreign-related when the object
of the dispute is outside China or where the legal relationship between the
parties was established, modified, or terminated outside China. Reinstein,
supra note 21, at 42 n.32.
58. Peerenboom, Evolving Regulatory Framework, supra note 31, at 12:11.
("According to the [SPC] interpretation, a "foreign element" refers to civil cases
in which: one party or both parties are foreigners, stateless persons, foreign
enterprises, or foreign organizations; or the legal fact of establishment,
modification, or termination of the civil legal relationship between the parties
occurred in a foreign country; or the object of the action is located in a foreign
country.").
59. Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China art. 16 (1994).
English translation available at
http://www.cietac.org.cn/english/laws/laws_5.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2008).
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III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
The Chinese judicial system suffers from serious
structural problems like local protectionism and a weak
judiciary. These deficiencies impact many areas of law in
China, including its arbitration law. The weaknesses in the
judiciary have not only stifled the ability of winning
arbitration parties to enforce their awards but also inhibited
broader social and economic development in China. The
government has implemented corrective measures to address
these problems, but greater reforms are necessary if China is
to realize its ambitions of developing a world-class arbitration
system and becoming a legitimate global superpower.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Obstacles to the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
A claimant holding a favorable arbitral award must
execute it through the Chinese court system when the
respondent fails to comply. Unfortunately for the claimant,
the enforcement of arbitral awards in China is far from
certain. The claimant must overcome significant barriers
before recovering her award. Assuming no procedural
violations exist with the arbitration agreement itself,60 the
claimant faces a host of systemic challenges in utilizing the
judicial system: local protectionism, a weak judiciary, and a
low level of judicial competence.61
1. Local Protectionism
Local protectionism62 is the most frequently cited obstacle
60. A court may refuse to enforce an arbitral award on procedural grounds.
Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts, supra note 15, at 265-66. Professor
Randall Peerenboom's independent study on arbitral award enforcement found
that Chinese courts refused enforcement of awards on the following procedural
grounds: problems with the appointment of arbitrators, the arbitration tribunal
lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter, the respondent was not a party to
the arbitration agreement, lack of a valid arbitration agreement, lack of notice,
the arbitration tribunal exceeded its authority, violation of public interest, and
insufficient evidence. Id.
61. See id. at 255. "[W]hile deficiencies in the regulatory framework
contribute to enforcement difficulties, the main obstacles are institutional in
nature." Id.
62. See id. at 269. In this context, local protectionism simply refers to when
government officials and courts give preferential treatment to local parties over
20081 657
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to enforcement.63 The same political and economic forces that
influence the outcome of judgments can also create major
obstacles to enforcing a judgment against a local individual or
enterprise.64
Local protectionism exists in many forms. Local officials
may pressure a court to decide a case in favor of the local
party, deny an outsider's application for enforcement, or drag
out the enforcement process. 65  For example, some judges
have required applicants seeking enforcement of arbitral
awards to provide additional documents not required by PRC
law, including evidentiary documents the arbitration
tribunals relied on in making the awards.66 Some courts even
require that these documents be translated and notarized to
further discourage the applicant and delay the enforcement
process.67
Another form of protectionism occurs when local
governments help companies hide or transfer assets, or avoid
debts.6  This appears to have taken place in the much-
maligned Revpower arbitration dispute.69  In this case,
Revpower Limited (Revpower), a United States company,
entered into a joint venture with a Chinese company in 1988
to develop a battery factory.7 ° When relations between the
two companies soured, Revpower took the case to
arbitration.71 The arbitration tribunal issued an award to
Revpower for $4.5 million USD (U.S. dollars) in July 1993.72
When Revpower brought the award to a Chinese court for
enforcement, the court refused such enforcement on the
grounds that there was an existing action pending abroad
involving the two companies.73 Under pressure from the SPC,
the court finally took the case and recognized the award in
March 1999. 74 However, by that time the Chinese company
parties from outside the immediate area. Id.
63. Clarke, supra note 3, at 41.
64. LUBMAN, supra note 22, at 268.
65. Id. at 276.
66. Reinstein, supra note 21, at 55.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts, supra note 15, at 250 n.5.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
658 [V01:48
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had transferred all its business and assets to its parent and
grandparent companies,75 making it impossible for Revpower
to recover.
Economic reforms and the organizational structure of
courts appear to be the root causes of local protectionism.76
These reforms have led to "a devolution of authority, and
fiscal responsibility, to local governments. 77  Local
governments, deprived of central government subsidies, must
now depend on tax revenues generated from local companies
to meet their fiscal needs.7" State-owned enterprise reforms
have also increased unemployment and added social welfare
and retraining costs to the already-tight budgets of local
governments. 79 Thus, local governments are concerned that
the enforcement of an adverse award could harm the local
economy through the loss of valuable assets or the closing of a
factory. 0 Additionally, local governments may actually own
all or part of the company against which enforcement is
sought. 1  Not surprisingly, local governments resist
enforcement attempts against firms in which they hold a
direct economic interest.
2
The position of the courts in the current constitutional
structure also fosters local protectionism. 3 As mentioned, the
government at each level appoints judges and funds courts. 4
Thus, basic and intermediate level courts rely on the
municipal government for salaries, bonuses, housing, etc. 5
This dependence grants local governments significant
leverage over the courts. 6  In some cases, government
officials have threatened to sever funding needed to build
housing for court personnel or intimidated individual judges
by ordering the transfer of the judge's daughter by her
employer to a distant city.8 7
75. Id.
76. Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts, supra note 15, at 278.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts, supra note 15, at 278.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 279; see also supra Part II.C.
85. Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts, supra note 15, at 279.
86. Id.
87. Clarke, supra note 3, at 42.
2008] 659
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In Professor Randall Peerenboom's independent study on
eighty-nine CIETAC and foreign arbitral award enforcement
cases, he downplays the significance of local protectionism.88
He found that insolvency of the respondent was the single
biggest reason for non-enforcement.8 9 Of the thirty-seven
non-enforcement cases in his survey, forty-three percent were
unenforceable because the respondent did not have the
necessary assets to pay the award. Yet many of these cases
of apparent insolvency could be a result of local
protectionism. 1 Peerenboom readily acknowledges that "local
officials may tip off local companies about an application for
enforcement, enabling them to transfer assets."92 Thus, local
protectionism may play a larger role in non-enforcement than
Peerenboom's study indicates.
2. Weak Judiciary
The Chinese judiciary differs significantly from its
counterparts in western countries, as discussed above. The
institutional differences and extra-judicial influences over a
judge's decision-making powers contribute to local
protectionism and the non-enforcement of arbitral awards. 4
The importance of judicial independence from corresponding
governmental bodies cannot be understated and has long
been recognized in the United States. 5
88. Reinstein, supra note 21, at 57.
89. Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts, supra note 15, at 273.
90. Id.
91. Reinstein, supra note 21, at 57.
92. Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts, supra note 15, at 277.
93. Id. at 294; see also supra Part II.A.
94. See Peerenboom, Evolving Regulatory Framework, supra note 31, at
12:2. "[Tlhe inability to enforce an award is often due to broader systemic and
institutional problems, such as local protectionism, a weak judiciary, corruption,
and the fallout from China's ongoing transition from a centrally planned to a
more market-oriented economy." Id.
95. See John Clifford Wallace, An Essay on Independence of the Judiciary:
Independence from What and Why, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 241 (2001).
In the United States.... [judicial independence] was confronted in the
debate over adoption of the Constitution. The appointment and
confirmation process, combined with the constitutional guarantee of
tenure during good behavior and a salary that will not be decreased, is
the Constitution's effort both to ensure the independence of the federal
judiciary in the face of political pressures, and to assure the people that
their disputes will be fairly settled by independent and unbiased
arbiters.
Id. at 242-43.
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Alexander Hamilton argued in The Federalist Papers No.
79 that "[nlext to permanency in office, nothing can
contribute more to the independence of the judges than a
fixed provision for their support .... In the general course of
human nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to
a power over his will."96 Indeed, as one Ninth Circuit judge
for the U.S. Court of Appeals stated, "Ulustice for sale is the
antithesis of judicial independence."97 The Chinese judiciary's
dependency on local party and government agencies
represents an enormous obstacle and must be overcome for
the successful promotion and development of judicial
independence.9"
Additionally, the judiciary's reluctance to use its
contempt powers represents another obstacle in the
enforcement process. 99 Chinese courts possess a variety of
contempt powers to combat parties that fail to comply with
the terms of an award or court order. 100 A court may impose
fines, detain, or even imprison individuals for non-
compliance.10 1 Some courts have even published the name of
the defaulting company in local newspapers."0 2
Unfortunately, courts hesitate to utilize these tools against
parties for non-compliance. 10 3
Peerenboom offers several reasons to explain this
reluctance. 10 4  First, local protectionism makes individuals
and companies, "for all practical purposes, judgment-proof."' 0
96. THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 234 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in THE
FEDERALIST PAPERS: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS WRITTEN IN SUPPORT OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 234, 234 (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed.,
Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1981) (1961) (emphasis omitted).
97. Wallace, supra note 95, at 248.
98. Veron Mei-Ying Hung, China's WTO Commitment on Independent
Judicial Review: Impact on Legal and Political Reform, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 77,
122 (2004). "[T]he fundamental problem of China's lack of an independent
judicial review system is rooted in the fact that the CCP and local governments
control the courts." Id.
99. Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts, supra note 15, at 295.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. "Besides putting pressure on the defaulting company to pay up or
suffer reputational damage, a public announcement provides notice to other
companies that the respondent may be unreliable or in poor economic
condition." Id.
103. Id. at 295.
104. Id.
105. Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts, supra note 15, at 295.
2008] 661
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Managers are often constrained by local government officials
who pressure or instruct them not to comply with the court's
orders. °6 A court may also fear greater unemployment and
social unrest from determining a case which prevents a
company from operating.107 Finally, the low stature of the
judiciary in society contributes to courts' reluctance to
exercise their judicial powers because courts fear they will be
unable to fine or detain non-compliant individuals.0 ° The
weakness inherent in the Chinese judiciary poses a
substantial problem to the effective enforcement of arbitral
awards and the broader development of the Chinese court
system.
3. Low Level of Judicial Competence
The low level of professionalism and competency by some
judges contribute to enforcement problems.10 9 Approximately
two-thirds of all judges do not possess a formal legal
education.110 These judges do receive legal training and
education but the effects of this are uncertain."1  Also,
approximately one-third of all judges are demobilized military
personnel.1 2 These military personnel have been a major
pool from which judges have been selected since the early
1950s. 1 13  Thus, because of their limited legal knowledge,
some judges base their decisions not on the law, but on
communist ideology.1
The government has responded to these shortcomings. In
1995 China issued the Judges Law which set forth objective,
minimum qualifications for judges."5 Chapter I, article I
notes the law was enacted to enhance the quality of judges, to
ensure courts independently exercise their authority, and to
ensure judges perform their functions and duties in
106. Id.
107. Id. at 296.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 297.
110. Taroh Inoue, Introduction to International Commercial Arbitration in
China, 36 HONG KONG L. J. 171, 193 (2006).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. LUBMAN, supra note 22, at 253.
114. Inoue, supra note 110, at 193.
115. LUBMAN, supra note 22, at 251.
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accordance with the law." 6  Chapter IV of the Judges Law
establishes minimum qualifications for becoming a judge in
the PRC:" 7 judges must be of Chinese nationality; must have
reached the age of twenty-three; must endorse the
Constitution of the PRC; must have "fine political and
professional quality [sic] and be good in conduct;" must be in
good health; and must have an advanced degree specializing
in law or must have one or more years of work experience if
they hold a college degree."' In addition, the law requires all
judges who do not possess the above qualifications to receive
training to attain those qualifications."19
Despite these efforts to improve judicial competence,
many judges remain poorly trained, particularly in regards to
the enforcement of judgments.1 20  Peerenboom's research
study showed that judges in several cases were unfamiliar
with both the rules regarding enforcement and the terms of
the New York Convention. 121 In one case, the court did not
know whether it should recognize the award and even what
documents were required. 122 In some cases, courts applied
the wrong standard or governing law. 23
These lapses of judgment may be caused by several
factors. First, the court may simply lack the substantive
knowledge necessary to adjudicate the decision. Enforcement
work is generally not considered one of the more prestigious
assignments for judges. 124 Accordingly, the judges assigned to
enforcement chambers usually have the least legal
training.' 25  "The work, for the most part, is not as
intellectually challenging as the work in other chambers.' 26
Second, enforcement is difficult in that judges are often
hindered by extrajudicial forces over which they have no
116. Law on Judges, ch. I, art. 1 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l
People's Cong., effective Jul. 1, 1995) 1995 STANDING COMM. NAT'L CONG. GAz.
(P.R.C.) [hereinafter Judges' Law]. English translation available at
http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=102 (last visited Jan. 31, 2008).
117. Id. at ch. IV.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts, supra note 15, at 297-98.
121. Id. at 298.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 298-99.
124. Peerenboom, Evolving Regulatory Framework, supra note 31, at 12:10.
125. Id. at 10.
126. Id.
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control. 2 7  Indeed, local protectionism may explain what
appears to be a lack of judicial competence and
sophistication.12 As mentioned above, requiring the
translation and notarization of documents may serve to
discourage and delay the enforcement process by forcing
parties to leap through additional, unnecessary bureaucratic
hurdles.'29 Third, judges might feign ignorance for simple
self-preservation.' 30  Unfortunately, judges have been
threatened or physically abused by outraged parties that did
not appreciate the court's attempts to enforce an award or
judgment. 131
B. Inadequate Government Measures to Address Enforcement
Problems
The Chinese government is aware of these institutional
problems and has taken steps to remedy them via
legislation.' 32  Unfortunately, regulations often contain
loopholes and/or inconsistencies that enable parties to escape
enforcement. 133  For example, the Supreme People's Court
(SPC) in 1995 created a reporting system to monitor lower
courts' refusals to enforce foreign arbitral awards.3 Before a
lower court can refuse enforcement, it must provide its
proposed decision to a higher court.135  This higher court is
then required to report its decision to the SPC and await
approval. 136 Thus, the SPC ultimately gives its approval for
the non-enforcement of a foreign arbitral award.137 Although
this reporting system offers obvious benefits, it is deficient in
many respects.
The reporting system applies only to foreign awards
127. Id.
128. Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts, supra note 15, at 299.
129. Id.
130. See Peerenboom, Evolving Regulatory Framework, supra note 31, at
12:10.
131. Id.
132. See Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts, supra note 15, at 320-21.
133. Id.
134. Reinstein, supra note 21, at 64. The SPC established this reporting
system in 1995 when it issued the "Notice of the Supreme People's Court on
Several Issues Regarding the Handling by the People's Court of Issues
Pertaining to Foreign-related Arbitration and Foreign Arbitration." Id.
135. Id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
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issued by foreign arbitration institutions and awards issued
by PRC foreign-related arbitration institutions, like
CIETAC. 38 The system does not apply to ad hoc foreign or
domestic awards and does not even appear to apply to
foreign-related awards of domestic arbitration commissions. 139
Additionally, the decision-making process entailed in the
reporting system lacks transparency. 140  The parties to the
arbitration may neither receive notice nor participate in the
hearing by the HPC or the SPC to determine whether to
enforce the award.14 ' They do not possess the right to submit
written documents in support of their position. 4 1 In fact,
parties often discover after-the-fact that delays in IPC
determinations are a result of the case being submitted to a
higher court for review. 43  Moreover, the 1995 Notice that
created the reporting system failed to impose time limits for
the IPC to seek approval from the HPC, for the HPC to
submit the case to the SPC, and for the SPC to make a
decision.14 In some cases, the SPC has taken years to make a
final decision.'45
The SPC issued new regulations in 2000 and 2002 in
order to monitor lower courts and fight local protectionism.
1 46
These regulations centralized enforcement and increased the
powers of Higher Level People's Courts (HPCs) and
Intermediate Level People's Courts (IPCs). The 2000
regulations bolstered the enforcement of civil judgments as a
whole by allowing HPCs to instruct lower courts to change
their decisions if the HPC believes the lower court erred.
47
138. Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts, supra note 15, at 287.
139. Id. at 287-88. "The Beijing Arbitration Commission H and the Shanghai
Arbitration Commission are heavily used domestic arbitration commissions. In
practice, domestic arbitration commissions accept mostly domestic cases ... "
Xiuwen & Kloppenberg, supra note 47, at 430.
140. Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts, supra note 15, at 288.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts, supra note 15, at 321 n.255 (citing
Regulations of the Supreme Court Concerning Several Issues Related to the
Unified Administration of Enforcement Work by the High People's Courts
(adopted by the Supreme People's Court Adjudicative Committee Jan. 14,
2000)).
147. Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts, supra note 15, at 321.
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HPCs may reassign a case from a BPC to an IPC or even
decide the case itself.148  Furthermore, HPCs can criticize
lower courts for failing to follow instructions and even
recommend disciplinary sanctions.
149
In terms of the enforcement of arbitral awards, the 2002
regulations confined the jurisdiction over awards to a small
number of IPCs and HPCs. 50 These courts are located near
the capital cities of provinces and special economic zones.
51
This localization was performed to take advantage of the
increased sophistication of cities concerning international
commerce and the more qualified, English-speaking judges.'52
Additionally, these specialized forums contain designated
departments that deal exclusively with arbitration awards.'
53
It is unlikely these regulations will suffice. Even
provincial and high-level governments cannot escape local
protectionism. 54 HPCs and IPCs are likely to have a greater
interest in local companies in the cities where they reside and
in companies within their own province.1 55 This is especially
true given courts are still financially dependent on local
governments who in turn are dependent on local businesses
for tax revenues and employment.' 56  Consequently, the
localization of jurisdiction over arbitral awards may be of
limited value without the elimination of local protectionism.
Furthermore, judges are not adequately protected and
insulated under these new regulations.' 5' The local people's
congresses may still remove judges with higher-level approval
and block a judge's opportunity for advancement. 5 8
Ultimately, significant hurdles remain.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 321-22.
150. Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Some Issues Concerning
the Jurisdiction of Civil and Commercial Cases involving Foreign Elements
(adopted Dec. 25, 2001 at the 1203rd Meeting of the Judicial Committee of the
Supreme People's Court, promulgated and effective Mar. 1, 2002).
151. 1 ARBITRATION IN CHINA: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 320 (Jerome A. Cohen et
al. eds., 2004).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 319-20.
154. See Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts, supra note 15, at 322.
155. Id. at 322-23.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 323.
158. Id.
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V. PROPOSAL
A. Deeper Reforms Are Necessary-Implementation of a
Federal Court System
The Chinese government must enact more radical
reforms than those already implemented to create a court
with sufficient authority to enforce arbitral awards. It must
eliminate local protectionism, increase judicial independence,
and strengthen the authority and competency of judges. The
addition of a federal court system would help achieve these
goals.
1. Structure of the Federal Court System
China should maintain multiple court systems. The first
would be the local court system, essentially preserving the
present three-tiered system based on provincial-, city-, and
county-level courts handling cases within their
jurisdictions.' 9  The second would be a federal system
comprised of the SPC, Appeals Courts, and Courts of First
Instance. 160 The Appeals Courts would possess jurisdiction
over multiple provinces similar to how U.S. Circuit Courts of
Appeals possess jurisdiction over multiple states. The SPC
could create a total of ten Appeals Courts, with each court
maintaining jurisdiction over three provinces. The Courts of
First Instance would operate like U.S. federal district courts
and possess jurisdiction over designated geographic areas
within provinces. The number of Courts of First Instance in a
particular area could be based on population density, with
more courts being located in densely populated areas.
Furthermore, these federal courts would be courts of
limited jurisdiction. The Courts of First Instance would be
the trial courts of the federal system that, as the name
suggests, represent the initial point of input for the federal
judicial system. These courts would have original jurisdiction
over cases where the parties fulfill a "diversity" requirement.
In other words, these cases must either involve more than one
province or one party must be a foreign party. Also, these
159. Cao Siyuan, China's Ailing Courts Need Federalist Medicine, WALL ST.
J., May 9, 1996 at 8.
160. Cai Dingjian, Development of the Chinese Legal System Since 1979 and
its Current Crisis and Transformation, 11 CULTURAL DYNAMICS 135, 161 (1999).
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courts would have jurisdiction over cases relating to national
interests or other large, complex cases. 161 If parties fail to
meet these requirements, they would be prohibited from
utilizing the federal court system and be required to file suit
in the local courts. Parties would naturally hold the right to
appeal the decisions made in the Courts of First Instance to
the Appeals Courts.
In addition, federal courts would assign only one judge to
a case.6 2 Judges in this system would not preside over cases
on a collegiate bench consisting of three judges, which is the
current arrangement in enforcement chambers for arbitral
awards. 3 Also, the federal judges on each level would rotate
for set periods of time to different regional federal courts. For
example, a federal judge in a Court of First Instance in the
Jiangsu province would transfer to a Court of First Instance
in the Hubei province after spending a fixed period of time in
the Jiangsu federal court. These measures would further
promote judicial independence and curtail local favoritism.
2. Appointment, Removal, Tenure & Salary
Currently, the National People's Congress (NPC) retains
the power to elect and remove the president of the Supreme
People's Court (SPC)."' Also, the Standing Committee of the
NPC appoints and can remove the other judges of the SPC.1 65
The federal judges of the Appeals Courts and the Courts of
First Instance should also be appointed by the Standing
Committee of the NPC in order to preserve existing selection
and evaluation procedures. The appointment standards upon
which these judges are evaluated must be set high and should
mirror the standards under which SPC judges are selected.
This process would ensure federal judges are of a comparable
caliber as SPC judges.
In order to attract top judges, the central government
should provide lifetime tenure to federal judges and protect
161. Id. at 161.
162. See id. at 162.
163. Peerenboom, Evolving Regulatory Framework, supra note 31, at 12:10.
164. Judges' Law, supra note 116, ch. V, art. 11.
165. The Supreme People's Court, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE,
http://english.people.com.cn/data/organs/court.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2008).
The Standing Committee is established by the National People's Congress to
exercise its authority when it is not in session. LIN FENG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW IN CHINA 64 (2000).
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the income of judges in a more stringent fashion. As
mentioned above, the government currently does not grant
tenure to judges. 166 Judges should not be removed from office
absent a showing of good cause such as fraud, misconduct,
bribery, etc. In addition, while the salaries of judges can be
raised, the law is silent as to reductions. 167 Income protection
provisions should be added to existing laws to guarantee that
salaries will not be decreased. Furthermore, the government
should increase salaries. These measures will help entice the
most capable and qualified judges to federal courts.
3. Justiciability Exception will Address CCP Political
Concerns
Ultimately, the key question that arises with the
establishment of a federal system in China is whether the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will allow courts to "achieve
sufficient autonomy and independence to command the
respect that is necessary to enforce the law." 6 ' While the
CCP prefers that a strong and competent judiciary adjudicate
commercial cases, it would not want courts deciding against
its wishes in politically-sensitive cases.1 69 Accordingly, the
federal system should include a justiciability exception for
politically-sensitive issues.
This exception could be modeled after the political
question doctrine in the United States, which considers the
subject matter of a suit to determine whether it is within the
power of the courts to decide. China's judiciary would
transfer to the CCP those cases with far-reaching political
and/or social repercussions. This justiciability exception
would serve the CCP's interests in monitoring and addressing
sensitive government issues while enabling the judiciary to
exercise the independence and legitimacy necessary to
eliminate local protectionism.
166. Reinstein, supra note 21, at 53.
167. See Judges' Law, supra note 116, ch. XII.
168. Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts, supra note 15, at 324.
169. Id. at 324-25.
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B. Benefits of a Federal Court System
1. Federal Court System Would End Local Protectionism
The federal system would increase judicial independence
and eliminate local protectionism. It would end local
favoritism by shifting the jurisdiction of the case to a neutral
level encompassing both parties. 7 ' For example, if two
parties in a suit were from the same county, the district BPC
would hear the case. If the two were from two different
counties, a higher-level IPC would hear the case; but, if the
two were from different provinces or major cities, or one was
a foreign party, then a federal Court of First Instance would
hear the case. In each instance a higher court, as compared
to one from the locales of the two parties, would review the
case and local favoritism would be eliminated.'7 '
Furthermore, federal courts would receive funding
directly from the central government and not local
governments. 7 2  This funding structure would sever the
judiciary's dependency on local interests and abolish the
localization of power in government and CCP officials. As a
result, local governments would be powerless to exert their
influence over cases.
Eradicating local protectionism would boost the
enforcement of arbitral awards. Judges could exercise their
authority without fear that local governments would cut their
funding. They would be free from interference with their
salaries, housing, personnel, etc. Federal judges would thus
operate independently under the rule of law, not the rule of
local government and/or party officials.
2. Federal Court System Would Strengthen the
Judiciary
With the end of local protectionism, federal courts would
possess increased authority over parties who previously had
been judgment-proof under the authority of local government
and/or CCP officials. Federal courts would exercise their
contempt powers to fine, detain, or imprison individuals for
non-compliance with an arbitral award. Thus, the provisions
170. Siyuan, supra note 159.
171. Id.
172. Dingjian, supra note 160, at 161.
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in the arbitration agreement and the parties' intent would be
properly effectuated under a stronger federal court system.
Moreover, federal judges would cease to be beholden to
chief judges or higher courts. These courts would be
prohibited from reviewing decisions of federal judges. In
contrast to the state system, the SPC would have no
authority to strip jurisdiction from federal courts to decide
cases. These federal judges would have the autonomy and
independence to exercise their own judgment in a case, unlike
state judges who must submit to the demands of chief judges
and adjudication committees. 17 Federal judges would retain
the authority to strike down regulations passed by
administrative agencies or local governments that are
inconsistent with the law. These increased judicial powers
would enhance the judiciary's legitimacy and status. The
public's increased respect and faith in the legal system would
promote deference and compliance for the rule of law. Indeed,
the number of arbitration enforcement cases may actually
decrease because parties would respect a stronger judiciary
and comply with the provisions of an arbitration award.
In addition, the lifetime tenure and salary provisions
proposed above would further promote judicial independence.
Judges, including those on the SPC, currently earn roughly
$240 USD per month, which is equivalent to the salary of
civil servants and mid-level bureaucrats. 174 Chinese judges
earn annually ten times less than Chinese lawyers. 75 These
low salaries, along with the financial dependence of the courts
on the government, tempt unscrupulous judges into accepting
bribes or favoring local parties1 76 and discourage talented
attorneys from accepting posts in the judiciary. Indeed,
judicial scandals have been reported frequently in China in
recent years. 77 In one of the most notorious cases, thirteen
judges of the Wuhan City Intermediate People's Court,
including two vice-presidents and some deputy presiding
173. See discussion supra Part II.B.
174. CHOW, supra note 5, at 204.
175. Lawyer-Judge Relations Under Fire at Legislature Annual Session,
PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE,
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200503/08/eng20050308_176082.html (last
visited Jan. 29, 2008).
176. Reinstein, supra note 21, at 53.
177. Lawyer-Judge Relations Under Fire at Legislature Annual Session,
supra note 175.
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judges, were found guilty of taking more than 4 million yuan
($480,000 USD) of bribes in 2004.178 More recently, in
October 2006, a former judge in east China's Anhui Province
was tried for bribery involving more than 800,000 yuan
($101,000 USD) and for being unable to account for an income
of 580,000 yuan. 9 The scandal also implicated the judge's
predecessor, two of his former deputies, and four subordinate
judges in the Fuyang court. 80 Awarding judges lifetime
tenure and increasing their salaries would promote judicial
independence and offer a greater level of protection against
judicial misconduct.
The founders of the United States recognized the benefits
of lifetime tenure and salary protections for judges.
Alexander Hamilton and the framers of the U.S. Constitution
confronted these issues in the early days of the United States
in arguing that tenure offered the best protection against
encroachment by the legislative branch. 8 ' Hamilton stated
that tenure provided for the "steady, upright, and impartial
administration of the laws."8 2 He also believed lifetime
tenure was essential in obtaining the best individuals from a
small population of judges who are both qualified and of
sufficient integrity to be worthy of the trust placed in them.8 3
Thus, China should offer lifetime tenure, as well as increased
salary benefits and protections to its federal judges to further
encourage judicial independence and recruit top judges.
These simple measures would benefit the enforcement of
arbitral awards, root out corruption, establish upright judicial
personnel, and create an image of a just judiciary.'
3. A Federal Court System Would Increase Judicial
Competence
The federal court system would raise judicial competence
178. Id.
179. Chinese Chief Justice Vows Severe Punishment for "Crooked" Judges,
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (BBC Int'l Reports), Oct. 30, 2006.
180. Id.
181. See Wallace, supra note 95, at 243.
182. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 226-27 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS WRITTEN IN SUPPORT OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 226, 226-27 (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d
ed., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1981) (1961).
183. Id. at 233.
184. Dingjian, supra note 160, at 160.
672 [Vo1:48
JUDICIAL REFORM IN CHINA
because federal judges would be required to hold greater
skills to execute their authority and administer decisions.
These judges must possess a higher level of intelligence,
experience, and integrity so that they could adjudicate cases
independently. They would be forbidden from relying on chief
judges, court presidents, or adjudication committees for
guidance or instructions. Additionally, federal judges must
possess increased aptitude and competency because they
would serve individually on the bench, rather than jointly on
a collegiate bench.
The enforcement of arbitral awards would benefit from
increased judicial competence. First, the high appointment
standards of federal judges would ensure that they possess
the substantive legal knowledge necessary to correctly decide
an arbitration enforcement case. These judges would undergo
intensive legal training and would not apply erroneous
standards of law or be unfamiliar with arbitration rules
regarding enforcement."8 5 Second, the increased legitimacy of
a federal judiciary and its relationship with the government
would deter threats to individual judges. Non-compliant
parties would hesitate to intimidate federal judges and incur
the full force and punishment of the central government.
Third, a competent and independent judge overseeing a case
would boost procedural efficiency."8 6  Judges would not
unduly delay the enforcement process by demanding
unnecessary documents or imposing other unwarranted
procedures on parties.
4. Additional Benefits of a Federal Court System
The establishment of a federal court system would yield
additional advantages. The new system would alleviate the
increased judicial workload state courts currently face. 8 7
Courts in China's poorer western regions face a shortage of
judges that have left courts virtually abandoned and others
relying on unqualified staff to handle cases. 88 In some
185. See Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts, supra note 15, at 298.
186. See Dingjian, supra note 160, at 162.
187. See Minnie Chan, Pledge to Speed up Judicial Reforms: Top Court
Officials Admit Legal System Has Not Kept Pace with Changes in Society, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 7, 2006, at 4.
188. Mure Dickie, China Losing Judges in Poorer Regions, FIN. TIMES (Asia),
Mar. 11, 2006, at 3.
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courts, secretaries decide cases and judges merely sign the
appropriate legal documents.1 8 9  The SPC estimates that
nearly 20,000 judges resigned over the last five years, most
from western regions.1 90
The reasons for these losses are due in part to a unified
national bar exam introduced in 2002 to improve the quality
of judges.' While the net effect of this exam appears to be
positive in that it encourages heightened standards for the
judiciary, it has caused candidates from poorer areas to
struggle to qualify as judges. 192 Thus, the exam requirements
make it difficult to replace those who retired or left because of
poor working conditions. 93 These shortages inevitably place
a burden on other courts or simply deny citizens the
opportunity for basic justice.
These poorer regions would directly benefit from a
federal court system, which would offer a much-needed forum
to adjudicate conflicts. Competent, independent and trained
federal judges would decide cases, not secretaries. Federal
courts would also assist overburdened state courts inundated
with cases from these poorer border regions.
Furthermore, establishing a federal court system would
serve a critical filtering function for the Supreme People's
Court (SPC) by allowing the SPC to adjudicate those
constitutional, civil, or criminal cases with broader, far-
reaching consequences. The federal courts would determine
cases with potentially more limited, narrow repercussions.
Just as the U.S. Supreme Court has increasingly become a
constitutional tribunal with the U.S. Courts of Appeals
focusing on statutory interpretation, administrative review,
and error correction,9 Chinese federal courts could operate
in the same manner. This would produce efficiency in the
allocation of judicial resources and specialization such that
the SPC would utilize its expertise in adjudicating only the
most significant cases.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN AMERICA 40
(4th ed. 1998) (citing J. Woodford Howard Jr., Courts of Appeals in the Federal
Judicial System: A Study of the Second, Fifth, and District of Columbia Circuits
(Princeton Univ. Press 1981)).
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C. The Chinese Legal Community Can Successfully Operate
the Federal Court System
Some scholars argue that the challenges of a dual court
system would be too complicated for Chinese legal
professionals and infrastructure. 195 They also argue that the
current number of Chinese legal professionals is insufficient
to maintain it. 96  The first argument presupposes that
Chinese legal professionals are incapable of understanding
basic procedural concepts like jurisdiction and transfer rules.
It is dismissive of alternative methods of education these
legal professionals underwent to compensate for their lack of
a formal legal education. Also, both arguments ignore recent
developments in legal education and in the legal profession,
as explained below.
Although many judges lack a formal legal education, they
still undertake considerable training. Former military
officers are instructed in "basic legal knowledge" and "legal
practice" in special training courses instituted by courts to
make up for their low educational level.197  The SPC
established formal training programs at numerous
universities where judges attend courses from one to three
years.198 Assistant judges can also enroll in one-year training
programs and be promoted to senior judge if they pass an
examination.'99 IPC and SPC judges can enroll in six-month
training programs.2 °° While the knowledge gained from this
on-the-job training may not equal that from a formal legal
education, it likely assists judges in understanding basic
court and procedural processes.
In addition, Chinese legal professionals would be able to
capably operate within a dual court system because of two
recent developments: the huge growth in legal education and
heightened standards within the legal profession itself.2'
195. See Inoue, supra note 110, at 194.
196. Id.
197. LUBMAN, supra note 22, at 253.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See Weifang He, China's Legal Profession: The Nascence and Growing
Pains of a Professionalized Legal Class, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 138, 145 (2005).
"The development of legal education has also improved the quality of the legal
profession.... [W]ith a growing market economy and the rising social demand
for an independent judiciary, legal professionals are now better educated than
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1. The Growth in Legal Education
The number of law schools increased from five in 1978 to
more than 300 in 2005.202 In 1978 only 600 students studied
law in China. °3 In 2005, Peking University Law School alone
boasted more than 2000 students.0 4 Today, the total number
of law students in China is estimated at 100,000.2°5 The
progress in legal education is illustrated "not only by the
growth in the number of students, but also by the diversity of
law degrees awarded."2°6  Most of these law students are
undergraduate students, however in some universities
Masters and Ph.D. students outnumber undergraduates. °7
Law has become one of the most popular majors in China and
holds greater appeal among more qualified students. °8 This
surge in legal education will most likely increase the overall
quality and competency of individuals entering the judiciary.
2. Heightened Standards Within the Legal Profession
Moreover, changes in the legal profession itself are
encouraging and suggest members of the legal community
would be able to successfully manage a dual court system.
Twenty years ago, judges possessed little legal education and
could not be trusted with complex legal matters.20 9 However,
the 1995 Judges Law raised the overall competency of the
judiciary by requiring that judges take examinations and
fulfill academic qualifications. 210  The grades from these
examinations serve as a basis for rewards, punishments,
training, dismissals, and readjustment of wages.211 Judges
face annual performance reviews and can be dismissed for,
among other reasons, an "incompetent" rating in two
consecutive years.212 Furthermore, as mentioned above, in
their predecessors." Id. at 145-46.
202. Id. at 145.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Law & Econ Prof. Blog, Law and Economics in China, Nov. 2, 2006,
http//lawprofessors.typepad.com/lawecon/2006/1 1/lawandeconomi.html.
206. He, supra note 201, at 145.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See id.
210. LUBMAN, supra note 22, at 254-55.
211. Id. at 255.
212. Id. at 255-56.
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2002 the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress introduced a unified national bar exam to improve
the quality of judges. 213 That year 300,000 individuals took
the bar exam with a seven percent pass rate.214 While these
exam requirements may initially produce challenges in poorer
regions of China, they will most likely boost the overall
sophistication and quality of judges in China. Consequently,
Chinese legal professionals would be able to successfully
manage the complexities of a dual court system.
Furthermore, the current number of legal professionals
would be sufficient to maintain this dual system. First, the
federal system would not be as expansive as the local court
system. China could initially establish a limited number of
Courts of First Instance and Appeals Courts and gradually
create more as needed. This phased transition would
conserve judicial personnel and resources and enable the
government to perfect the operational details of running a
federal court system before creating additional courts.
Second, the Chinese legal community would be able to staff
these federal courts because of the large number of law
students graduating each year and the current number of
legal professionals practicing in China. Today, the Chinese
legal community consists of approximately 102,000 lawyers
and over 200,000 judges.215 Moreover, offering lifetime tenure
and increased benefits and salaries to judges would surely
expand the pool of capable individuals interested in
populating a federal judiciary.
3. Costs of a Federal Court System Are Not Prohibitive
The costs of a federal system would not be prohibitive
because federal courts would not mirror the structure of state
courts. First, as mentioned above, the government could
create a small number of Courts of First Instance and
Appeals Courts in order to minimize costs. Second,
Adjudication Committees would be eliminated in federal
courts.216 This would reduce costs, increase trial efficiency,
ensure the neutrality of judges, allow judges to concentrate
213. He, supra note 201, at 146.
214. Id.
215. Lawyer-Judge Relations Under Fire at Legislature Annual Session,
supra note 175.
216. Dingjian, supra note 160, at 162.
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their energies on hearing and deciding cases, and lessen
judicial opportunities for corruption.2 17 Each federal court
would thus possess a president, vice-president, judges and
clerks. Third, the government would abandon the collegiate
bench structure that characterizes the current local court
system.21 8 A single judge would review cases in federal
courts,219 which would lower costs and increase procedural
efficiency.22 °
The total costs of a federal court system do not represent
an insurmountable obstacle. These costs are far less onerous
when compared against China's vast financial resources. The
government's foreign exchange reserves recently broke all
global records and reached $1.4 trillion USD.22 1 China clearly
possesses the means to implement such a system. The
enforcement of arbitration awards is just one of many areas of
law that would directly benefit from a federal system. The
long-term gains to society of a reliable and independent
judiciary will most certainly outweigh the short-term costs of
implementing this system.
VI. CONCLUSION
China's judiciary contains severe structural deficiencies
that limit judicial independence and encourage local
protectionism. The enforcement of arbitral awards is
hindered significantly by these structural problems. Current
reform measures are insufficient and more radical reforms
are necessary. The Chinese government should implement a
federal court system to promote judicial independence and
eradicate local protectionism and favoritism. Such
implementation would empower the judiciary considerably
and facilitate the enforcement of arbitral awards. Also, a
robust, independent judiciary would further entice foreign
investors to China, maintain the country's dramatic growth
and keep it on course to becoming a legitimate, global
217. Id. at 161-62.
218. Id. at 162; see also LUBMAN, supra note 22, at 252.
219. Dingjian, supra note 160, at 162.
220. Id.
221. State Administration of Foreign Exchange, People's Republic of China,
Monthly Foreign Exchange Reserves, 2007,
httpJ/www.safe.gov.cn/model-safe-en/tjsj-en/tjsj-detail-en.jsp?ID=3030300000
0000000,16&id=4 (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
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superpower.
China's efforts in judicial reform over the past twenty
years allow for cautious optimism. The government has
enacted meaningful, albeit flawed, regulations to help limit
government interference in judicial decision-making.222 In
addition, recent statements made by the SPC and CCP on
judicial reform and curbing government interference 223
suggest the government recognizes the value of judicial
independence and possesses the political will to remedy and
prevent violations. A federal court system may indeed lie in
China's foreseeable future and provide arbitration parties, as
well as Chinese citizens and foreign investors, a genuine
reason to celebrate.
222. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
223. Hung, supra note 98, at 124. In July 2002, the SPC made strong
statements about government interference and its plan to deal with the
problem. Id. Xiao Yang, President of the SPC, stated "judges should be
'immune from local interference."' Id. (citing China Vows to Improve Judicial
System, Address Problem of 'Incompetent' Judges, AFx-ASIA, July 8, 2002,
available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File). The SPC pledged to
eliminate "interference from administrative organs, social organizations, and
individuals" and "interventions from local and departmental protectionism." Id.
at 124 (citing Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Jiaqiang Faguan Duiwu
Zhiyehua Jianshe De Ruogan Yijian [Supreme Court's Several Opinions
Concerning Strengthening the Construction of Professional Judge Contingent],
para. 10 (promulgated and effective July 29, 2002). Furthermore, the CCP
several months later pledged to "reform" courts' financial and personnel
arrangements. Id. at 124. In 2003 the CCP adopted a resolution emphasizing
"that 'institutional reform' is the priority task for judicial reform." Id.

